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Hamm: Modifying the Filibuster: A Means to Foster Bipartisanship While

NOTE
MODIFYING THE FILIBUSTER: A MEANS TO
FOSTER BIPARTISANSHIP WHILE REINING IN ITS
MOST EGREGIOUS ABUSES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, a parliamentary maneuver in the U.S.
Senate known as the filibuster has been the subject of considerable
debate.1 Defined as a "deliberate use of prolonged debate and procedural
delaying tactics to block action supported by a majority of members,"
the filibuster in its current form allows a minority of the Senate to block
the body from considering a given matter unless three-fifths of the
Senate votes for cloture on the filibuster.2 Once a rarely used maneuver
that put an enormous burden on the individuals choosing to use it, the
filibuster has become easier to use, and increasingly commonplace.3 The
filibuster is now sometimes used even on completely noncontroversial
matters that ultimately pass with little or no opposition.4 With the
1. See generally, e.g., Examining the Filibuster:HearingsBefore the S. Comm. on Rules and
Admin., 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-I llshrg62210
/pdf/CHRG-I 1lshrg622O.pdf (compiling several hearings the U.S. Senate has held on the issue).
2. Filibuster, CQ ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. GOV'T, http://www.cqpress.com/incontext/
supremecourt/filibuster.htm (last visited July 27, 2012); see also Examining the Filibuster:History
of the Filibuster 1789-2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 111th Cong. 23
(2010) [hereinafter History of the Filibuster] (statement of Stanley I. Bach, Retired, Senior
Specialist in the Legislative Process, Congressional Research Service), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg62210/pdf/CHRG-111shrg62210.pdf (setting forth
three-fifths of the Senators as the current cloture requirement); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (4th
ed. 1968) (defining cloture as "[t]he procedure in deliberative assemblies whereby debate is
closed").
3. See Examining the Filibuster: The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 111 th Cong. 147 (2010) [hereinafter The Filibuster
Today and Its Consequences] (statement of Hon. Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-lI lshrg62210/pdf/CHRG-11 shrg62210.pdf
(describing how filibustering has become easier); Filibuster, supra note 2 (describing several
grueling filibusters of the past); see also Senate Actions on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloturemotions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited July
27, 2012) (showing the increasing number of cloture motions over the years).
4. See, e.g., Andrew Clevenger, Keenan Confirmed, But Why Via Cloture?, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (Mar. 2, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://blogs.wvgazette.com/watchdog/2010/03/02/keenanconfirmed-but-why-via-cloture/ (describing a filibuster against a judicial nominee who was
ultimately confirmed 99-0).
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increased frequency of the filibuster has come the increased use of the
"hold," a Senate practice which derives its power from the filibuster and
allows an individual Senator to stop or delay the Senate from voting on
an issue by the mere act of threatening to vote against cloture.5
Supporters of these practices argue that they are important to
forging compromise and preventing partisan legislation from being
enacted into law too quickly, and from keeping truly extreme appointees
out of government positions. 6 Gregory Koger, a professor of political
science at the University of Miami, supports the filibuster because it
provides stability for the country by preventing radical policy shifts
whenever a new party takes control of Congress. 7 Detractors argue that
filibusters are often used inappropriately on what should be routine votes
and make it too difficult to pass legislation.8 Some even argue that
"majority rules" should govern and favor reforms that would allow the
Senate to pass legislation on a simple majority vote.9
This Note will discuss the filibuster's history and usage, and make
proposals for ways it should be modified. Part II will discuss the creation
and development of the filibuster and by extension the hold. Part III will
discuss the recent abuse of these practices and demonstrate a need for
reform. Part IV will discuss some recent attempts at reform, that in some
cases passed and in some cases failed, as well as other proposals for
reform that have been proposed, but on which the Senate has not voted.
Finally, Part V will advocate for future reforms that would place the
onus of a filibuster more clearly on the minority party, reduce the
threshold for cloture if the majority party can persuade members of the
minority party to vote to invoke cloture, and reduce the ability of
Senators to place holds on noncontroversial matters.
5. See Ezra Klein, What Is a "Hold? ", WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:37 AM), http://voices.
washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/02/what-is a hold.html; Press Release, Michael F. Bennet,
Filibuster Reform Key to Ending Needless Washington Dysfunction (July 28, 2010), http://bennet.
senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=A 178AF59-9635-46B5-A56E-65DI 89CA2671 [hereinafter
Press Release, Bennet]; David Waldman, So What's Up with "Holds" in the Senate, Anyway?,
DAILY KoS (June 28, 2008, 11:20 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/06/28/542115/-Sowhats-up-with-holds-in-the-Senate-anyway.
6. See, e.g., The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 143 (statement of
Sen. Pat Roberts, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.); Editorial, Filibustera Radical: Obama
Is Promotingan Abortion Extremistfor Justice, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A20.
7. Joan Indiana Rigdon, FilibusterReform?, WASH. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 24, 26-27.
8. See, e.g., Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Senate Should Hold Up-Or-Down Votes on
Noncontroversial Judicial Nominees (Mar. 2, 2010), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/pressreleases
/release/?id=947918c9-d78a-4746-83 lb-f99c9a9a9bc0
[hereinafter
Press Release, Leahy]
(chastising the usage of the filibuster on noncontroversial nominations); Ezra Klein, The Myth of
Bipartisanship, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 9, 2009), http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article--the-myth
of bipartisanship (arguing that the filibuster thwarts "successful governance").
9. See Klein, supra note 8.
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HISTORY OF THE FILIBUSTER AND THE HOLD

This Part will discuss the creation of the filibuster and the hold. The
Senate took actions early in its history which inadvertently enabled the
filibuster."' Since then, the filibuster has been used with increasing
frequency and has been reformed in various ways. 1 In recent times, the
filibuster has also enabled the hold, which can allow a single Senator to
impede Senate business. 2
A. Invention by Mistake: The Creationof the Filibuster
3
The filibuster did not exist as part of the original Senate rules.'
While some tactics to obstruct legislation were available when the
Senate was first created, ultimately Senators at that time operated under
a presumption that eventually legislation would be brought to the floor,
and that a majority would be sufficient for passage.' 4 The "previous
question motion" in the early Senate allowed for a majority of Senators
to vote that enough debate had taken place on a particular measure and
that it was time to send the matter to the floor, where it could pass with a
simple majority. 15 The filibuster was made possible in 1806 when Vice
President Aaron Burr convinced the Senate to "get rid of the previous6
question motion" as part of an effort to make the Senate rules simpler.'
This took away the Senate's power to cut off debate by a vote of the
majority of Senators. 17 Even so, filibusters were rarely used before the
Civil War, as Senators continued to operate under the assumption that a
majority vote could cut off debate.' 8
B. An Infrequent Speed Bump Becomes a FrequentRoad Block:
The Evolution of the Filibuster
Senators began to use filibusters in the 1840s, beginning with a
filibuster against 1841 legislation to create the Second Bank of the
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN

THE UNITED STATES SENATE 5 (1997).

14. Id.
15. See History of the Filibuster, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Sarah A. Binder,
Department of Political Science, George Washington University); BINDER & SMITH, supra note 13,
at 5.
16. History of the Filibuster,supranote 2, at 17 (statement of Sarah A. Binder, Department of
Political Science, George Washington University) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 18.
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United States. 19 Senator Henry Clay (R-KY) then sought to revive the
previous question motion as a means for overcoming the filibuster and
closing off debate.2 ° Faced with opposition in both the Democratic and
Whig parties, Senator Clay backed down from this proposal. 2' As time
progressed, the Civil War and Reconstruction Eras saw increasingly
frequent filibusters used on civil rights issues. The only way to
overcome filibusters at that time was with unanimous consent, and as
such, these early filibusters were very difficult to overcome.23 Additional
attempts to end filibusters by reinstituting the previous question motion
remained unsuccessful.24

Eventually, during World War I, public outrage caused the Senate
to enact a cloture rule proposed by President Woodrow Wilson.25 When
Congress attempted to authorize defense funding in response to
unrestricted submarine warfare, a group of isolationist Senators
filibustered the funding and prevented it from passing.26 The public
reacted immediately and negatively to this development, and President
Wilson famously decried that, "[a] little group of willful men ...

have

rendered the great government of the United States helpless and
contemptible. 2 7 President Wilson then called a special session of
Congress to address the issue of filibusters.28 The party caucuses
ultimately endorsed a compromise solution creating a cloture rule.2 9
According to the rule, a filibuster could be overcome if "two-thirds of all
senators present and voting" voted in favor of cloture.30
"[C]loture was first invoked in 1919 on the Treaty of Versailles.'
However, cloture votes remained rare-there were only sixteen cloture
votes between 1927 and 1962, most of which involved civil rights
issues, and very few of which were successful. 32 At the same time,
however, Senators who engaged in filibusters had an incredible burden
to go through because they had to continually talk; Senator Strom
Thurmond (R-SC) famously spoke for over twenty-four hours with rare
19.
20.

MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 49 (2d ed. 2008).
Id.

21.

Id.at 50.

22.

Filibuster,supranote 2.

23. Id
24. GOLD, supranote 19, at 50.
25.

Filibuster,supra note 2.

26. See GOLD, supra note 19, at 51.
27. GOLD, supranote 19, at 51; Filibuster,supra note 2.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

GOLD, supranote 19, at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52-53; Filibuster,supra note 2.
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respite in a filibuster against civil rights legislation.33 The 1939 film Mr.
Smith Goes to Washington,34 where a Senator continues to speak nonstop
in opposition to a Senate action,35 popularized the image of this kind of
filibuster, and the film has since become part of the dialogue when
filibusters are discussed (this Note refers to this approach as a "Mr.
Smith-style" filibuster).36
The civil rights filibusters prompted efforts to make it easier to
invoke cloture.37 Eventually, in the 1970s, the cloture rule was reduced
from "two-thirds of the Senators present and voting" to sixty votes. 38
At the same time, "two-tracking" was created. 39 Two-tracking, also
known as double-tracking, allows the Senate to temporarily set aside a
filibustered matter and move on to other business. 40 This reform made it
easier to complete the backlog of Senate business in the event of a
filibuster, as filibusters no longer brought the Senate to a halt the way
they once had.41 But this reform also had a downside, as much of the
onus on the minority to sustain a filibuster was removed.4243Since the
1970s reforms, filibusters have become increasingly common.
33.

Filibuster,supranote 2.

34.

MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939).

35. Seegenerallyid
36. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Henry Clay Hated It. So Does Bill Frist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2004, § 4, at 5 ("When Jimmy Stewart filibustered in 'Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,' audiences
cheered. It's been downhill ever since."); Derek Wallbank, Democratsto Use Mondale Strategy in
Filibuster-Reform Attempt, MINNPOST (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.minnpost.com/derekwallbank/
2011/01/04/24556/democrats to use mondalestrategyinfilibuster-reform attempt (describing a
filibuster reform proposal as "hav[ing the filibustering Senator], as Jimmy Stewart did in that
memorable scene from 'Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,' stand on the floor and talk until they
exhaust themselves"); see also Filibuster, ICONIC PHOTOS (Nov. 6, 2009, 8:34 AM),
https://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/tag/mr-smith-goes-to-washington/.
37. Filibuster,supranote 2.
38. The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 137-38 (statement of Sen.
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.).
39. Id. at 147 (statement of Hon. Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
40. See Christopher Brauchli, Filibusters Could Be Fun, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2010,
11:59
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-brauchli/filibusters-could-be-fun-b
412394.html ("Under the two track rule more than one bill can be pending on the floor of the Senate
as unfinished business. Thus, if a filibuster of a given bill is threatened, the senate pretends that the
filibuster is taking place but continues working on other legislation."); Filibuster, supra note 2 ("If
the first cloture vote failed, more were taken. Meanwhile, leaders often shelved the disputed bill
temporarily, with members' unanimous consent, so that the Senate could turn to other matters. That
tactic ... [was] known as double-tracking.").

41. See The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 147 (statement of Hon.
Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUST., FILIBUSTERS, SECRET HOLDS, AND OBSTRUCTION OF
JUDICIAL NOMINEES 1 (2010), available at http://www.afj.org/judicial-selectionlafj-reportfilibusters-of-judicial-nominations.pdf (demonstrating an increase in filibusters on judicial
nominations, specifically); BINDER & SMITH, supra note 13, at 10, fig.l-1; Senate Actions on
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One specific area where filibustering has become more frequent is
on the issue of judicial nominations. 44 In the 1960s, the filibuster was
successfully used to deny Supreme Court Associate Justice Abe Fortas
the position of Chief Justice.45 During President Bill Clinton's
administration, some Senate Republicans voted to filibuster the judicial
nominations of H. Lee Sarokin,46 Richard Paez,47 and Marsha Berzon.48
These filibusters did not ultimately derail these nominations, as cloture
was successfully invoked on all three nominations. 49 Despite these
Republicans' failure to prevent cloture from being invoked on these
nominees, President Clinton nevertheless faced considerable difficulties
in getting many of his judicial nominations confirmed as a result of
parliamentary maneuvers. 50
During George W. Bush's presidency, Senate Democrats revived
the tactic of judicial filibustering, and by 2005, successfully filibustered
ten of his judicial nominations.51 In January 2005, President Bush reCloture Motions, supra note 3 (showing an increasing number of cloture motions in more recent
Congresses).
44. See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, Supreme Court's Future, 15 C.Q. RESEARCHER 79, 85 (2005);
Charles Babington, FilibusterPrecedent? Democrats Point to '68 and Fortas, WASH. POST, Mar.
18, 2005, at A3.
45. Babington, supranote 44, at A3.
46. See 140 CONG. REC. 27481-82 (1994); Helen Dewar, Mitchell Vows to Extend Senate
Session to End GOP Filibusters,WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at A4 (explaining that Majority Leader
George Mitchell scheduled a vote on ending the filibuster of then-U.S. District Court Judge
Sarokin's nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and that "some
Republicans have complained that [Judge Sarokin] is a liberal activist").
47. See 146 CONG. REc. 2224-25 (2000); On the Cloture Motion (Cloture Motion RE: Nom.
of Richard Paez to Be US. Circuit Judge), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/roll call vote cfin.cficongress=106&session=2&vote=00037 (last visited July 27,
2012) [hereinafter Paez Cloture Motion] (setting forth the fourteen Republicans voting against the
end of debate on March 8, 2000).
48. 146 CONG. REC. 2224 (2000); Chris Bowers, Right Wing Power Grab: Frist Voted to
Continue a FilibusterAgainst a JudicialNominee, MY DIRECT DEMOCRACY (Apr. 19, 2005, 8:27
AM), http://mydd.com/2005/4/19/right-wing-power-grab-frist-voted-to-continue-a-filibuster-against
a-judicial-nominee ("On March 8, 2000, thirteen Senators, all of whom were Republicans,
attempted to filibuster Marsha Berzon for U.S. Circuit judge.").
49. See Helen Dewar, Senate GOP Tactics Threaten Lobbying, Education, Environment Bills,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1994, at A4; On the Cloture Motion (Cloture Motion RE: Nom. of Marsha L.
Berzon to Be US. Circuit Judge), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call
lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?congress=106&session-2&vote=00036 (last visited July 27, 2012)
(demonstrating that the cloture motion on the Berzon nomination was agreed to); Paez Cloture
Motion, supra note 47 (demonstrating that the cloture motion on the Paez nomination was agreed
to).
50. See generally Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228 (2001) (detailing the various methods of obstruction that were deployed against
President Clinton's judicial nominees, ultimately concluding that "[tihe legacy of the Clinton years
is that the confirmation process can no longer be seen as routine but a matter of intense partisan and
ideological concern for all court levels").
51. Jost, supra note 44, at 85.
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nominated many of the filibustered nominees, a move which irked many
Democrats. Controversy over judicial filibustering came to a climax in
2005, when Senate Republicans prepared to hold a vote to amend the
Senate rules to ban the use of the filibuster on judicial nominations,53
with Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) having previously
described the filibuster as "nothing less than a formula for tyranny by the
minority., 54 The controversy was diffused when an agreement was
reached between a group of seven Republican and seven Democratic
Senators to reserve the use of filibustering against judicial nominations
only for "extraordinary circumstances. 55 Signatories of the document
pledged to vote for cloture on the pending nominations of Janice Rogers
Brown, Priscilla Owen, and William Pryor, but made no such
commitment to vote for cloture on the pending nominations of William
Myers and Henry Saad.56 Years later, under President Barack Obama,
Senate Republicans, along with Democratic Senator Benjamin Nelson,
successfully used the filibuster to derail the nomination of Goodwin Liu
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.5 7 A similar filibuster
against Judge David Hamilton ultimately failed, and he was confirmed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.58 The filibuster
now seems an entrenched tactic for blocking judicial nominations. 59
C. Mr. President,I Object!: The Creation of the Hold
The filibuster also empowers the practice of the so-called Senate
"hold., 6° A hold can allow even a single Senator to block the Senate
from considering a given issue. 6 1 A Senator exercises a hold by
52. See id. at 86.
53. See id.; Carl Hulse, FilibusterFight Nears Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 1.
54. Shane, supra note 36, § 4, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted); Portrait Unveiling
Ceremony for FormerSenate MajorityLeader Bill Frist (R-TN), C-SPAN (Mar. 3, 2011, 11:54 AM),
http://www.c-span.org/Events/Portrait-Unveiling-Ceremony-for-Former-Senate-Majority-LeaderBill-Frist-R-TN/10737419973/ (demonstrating that Senator Frist was a Republican Senator from
Tennessee).
55. See Memorandum of Understanding on Judicial Nominations from U.S. Senate (May 23,
2005) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], available at http://www.cspan.org/pdf/senate
compromise.pdf; Judicial Vacancies, A.B.A. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/
advocacy/govemmental-legislative-work/priorities-policy/independence-of-the-judiciary/judicia
vacancies.html.
56. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 55.
57. Abby Phillip, Goodwin Liu Withdraws Nomination, POLITICO (May 25, 2011, 7:04 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55724.html; Meredith Shiner, Senate GOP Filibusters
Liu, POLITICO (May 19, 2011, 2:41 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55320.html.
58. See Press Release, Leahy, supranote 8.
59. See supratext accompanying notes 44-58.
60. See Waldman, supra note 5.
61. See id.
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informing his or her respective party leader that he or she intends to
object to bringing an issue to the floor of the Senate for consideration.6 2
A Senator who objects to a unanimous consent motion to bring an issue
to the floor usually is giving an implied threat that he or she will
filibuster.63 Senate Majority Leaders can, and have, forced a vote on the
64
issue in spite of this threat. However, if the Senator placing the hold
does in fact filibuster-even if no additional Senators support the
filibuster-the process can still force the Senate to spend substantial
amounts of time debating the issue, as Senate rules allow up to thirty
hours of debate once a cloture motion is invoked.65 Holds are frequently
used on confirmation votes for various nominations made by the
President.66
Like the contemporary filibuster, holds became increasingly
frequent in the late 1970s. 67 This trend was furthered as lobbyists and
other influential parties outside of the Senate itself became familiar with
the practice and urged Senators to use the hold to further their own pet
issues.6 8 In 1981, Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN) treated holds
as binding, but grew frustrated with the practice and eventually decided
not to treat them as binding. 69 However, his recantation had only a
limited effect, as the hold was still made effective by the parliamentary
maneuvers Senators could deploy if their holds were not honored. 70 At
that time, holds were also strengthened by their anonymity-in many
cases the identity of the Senator placing the hold did not need to be
disclosed. 7' Liberal Democratic Senator Howard Metzenbaum became
especially fond of using the hold.72 His usage of the tactic became so
pervasive that Republican Majority Leaders in the 1980s frequently
screened matters with him in advance, instead of using the Democratic
62. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31685, PROPOSALS TO REFORM
"HOLDS" IN THE SENATE 1 (2007).
63. Waldman, supranote 5.
64. See STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 11
(1989).
65. See Waldman, supranote 5.
66. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Sen. GillibrandWants McHugh Hold Lifted, HILL (Aug. 13, 2009,
8:39 AM), http://thehill.comfhomenews/senate/5461 I -sen-gillibrand-wants-mchugh-hold-lifted
(discussing a hold placed on the nomination of John McHugh to be the Secretary of the Army);
Wallbank, supra note 36 (describing a blanket hold a Senator placed on several nominations).
67. SMITH, supra note 64, at 110; see also sources cited supranote 43.
68. See SMITH, supranote 64, at 110-11.
69. Id. at 111-12; Baker, Howard.Henry, Jr., (1925 -), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S.
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scriptsfbiodisplay.plindex=b000063 (last visited July 27,
2012) (demonstrating Senator Baker's party and state).
70. See SMITH, supranote 64, at 112.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 113.
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leadership as a liaison.73 Democrats also gave him special treatment,
giving him a check-off box for clearing measures for floor action
alongside the check-off boxes for the Democratic leader and ranking
committee member.74 In addition to being used to block or impede the
issue at hand, holds also became a tool to extract concession on entirely
unrelated issues.75 The hold remains in practice to this day; recent
examples include a 2010 hold on the continuation of unemployment
benefits 76 and holds on a plethora of nominations made by the
President.77
1II.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM

This Part will discuss the current problems with the filibuster and
hold. It has become increasingly easy for Senators to filibuster,7 8 which
has led to the increased use of filibusters and holds for reasons entirely
unrelated to the substantive issue being debated, 79 and even for reasons
filibustering Senators have been unable to articulate.8 ° Increasing
polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties has
exacerbated the problem by making it harder to overcome a filibuster.8 1
One of the most notable adverse consequences of the increasing use of
the filibuster is the current crisis ofjudicial vacancies.82
A. Laidback Obstructionism:
The Onus Is on the Majority to Overcome the Filibuster
Prior to the 1970s reforms, if Senators wanted to filibuster, they
faced a heavy burden because they had to continually hold the floor.83
The 1970s reforms lifted much of that onus and placed it on the
majority, 84 forcing Senators in the majority to sometimes endure great
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.atl1O-11.
76. See Nancy Cordes, Lone Senator Blocks Jobless Benefits, CBS (Mar. 2, 2010, 11:11 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/01/eveningnews/main6256808.shtml?tag=contentMain;co
ntentBody.
77. See sources cited supra note 66.
78. See infra Part III.A.
79. See infra Part III.B.
80. See infra Part III.C.
81. See infra Part II1.D.
82. See infra Part IIL.E.
83. See Filibuster,supra note 2.
84. See IRA SHAPIRO, THE LAST GREAT SENATE: COURAGE AND STATESMANSHIP IN TIMES
OF CRISIS 231 (2012) (explaining that the 1970s reforms created the sixty-vote threshold); Derek
Wallbank, Franken Introduces Reverse-Cloture Rule to Shift Filibuster Burden to Minority Party,
MINNPOST (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.minnpost.com/dc-dispatches/20 11/0 1/franken-introduces-
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personal hardship to appear in the Senate and vote for cloture even
though the bill had clear majority support.8 5 In February 2009, Senator
Sherrod Brown (D-OH) had to be flown from Ohio, where he was
attending a wake for his recently-deceased mother, to Washington, D.C.
to provide the critical sixtieth vote on an economic stimulus bill, only to
then be flown back to Ohio to attend his late mother's funeral.8 6 In
addition to the personal inconvenience to Senator Brown, the Senate had
to delay the vote by several hours in order to accommodate him.8 7 In
December 2009, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), at that point in
deteriorating health and facing mobility difficulties, had to be constantly
wheeled into the Senate, sometimes late at night or during frigid
weather, to cast the sixtieth vote on various motions relating to the
passage of a major health care reform bill.88
By contrast, the minority does not even need to appear in the Senate
to block a bill through the filibuster; the onus is on the majority to
invoke cloture, not on the minority to prevent it from being invoked.8 9 In
September 2011, thirty-three Senators, just less than a third of the body's
members, 90 were able to stop the passage of a hurricane-relief bill by
voting against cloture even though a bipartisan majority of Senators
voted for cloture. 9' The filibuster was only overcome when additional
92
Senators returned to the Senate to vote in favor of the legislation.
Similarly, in February 2010, thirty-three Senators defeated a cloture
motion on the confirmation of Craig Becker to the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB").93 President Obama later bypassed the
reverse-cloture-rule-shif-filibuster-burden-minority-party (explaining how the sixty-vote threshold
puts the onus of a filibuster on the majority).
85. See, e.g., Paul Kane, From Sen. Byrd, a Spirited "Aye", WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2009, at
Al;

White House Provides Plane to Senator for Key Stimulus Vote, CNN (Feb. 13, 2009),

http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-13/politics/brown.stimulus.vote.flight_lwhite-house-stimulusplan-billion-economic-stimulus-package?_s=PM:POLITICS; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at
231.
86.
87.

White House ProvidesPlane to Senator for Key Stimulus Vote, supra note 85.
See id.

88. See Kane, supranote 85, at A6.
89. See Press Release, Bennet, supranote 5; Rules of the Senate: Precedence of Motions, U.S.
SENATE COMMrrEE ON RULES & ADMIN., http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII
(last visited July 27, 2012) (requiring three-fifths of the Senate to vote for cloture to invoke it).
90.

See Senators of the 112th Congress,

U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/general/

contactinformation/senators cfm.cfm (last visited July 27, 2012) (noting that there are 100
Senators in the U.S. Senate).
91. See Horace Boothroyd III, Breaking: Senate Passes Disaster Aid Past Republican
Filibuster Hurdle, DAILY Kos (Sept. 13, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story

/2011/09/13/1016611 /-Breaking:-Senate-Passes-Disaster-Aid-Past-Republican-Filibuster-Hurdle.
92. See id.
93.

See Kevin Bogardus, Labor Pick Is Voted Down in the Senate, HILL (Feb. 9, 2011, 10:23

PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/80481 -labor-pick-is-voted-down-in-the-senate.
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confirmation process and appointed Mr. Becker to the position via a
recess appointment. 94 The ability to successfully filibuster with so little
burden on the minority stands in stark contrast to the previous form of
filibuster,
when the filibustering Senator had to continually hold the
5
9

floor.

B. How Is This Relevant?:
FilibustersandHolds Are Usedfor InappropriateReasons
Another problem with the current system is that filibusters and
holds are used on noncontroversial issues wholly unrelated to the issue
at hand. 96 While Senator Strom Thurmond's filibustering of the Civil
Rights Act is abhorrent by modem standards, his statement that the bill
was unconstitutional and that it constituted "cruel and unusual
punishment," and the grueling marathon session he endured to perform
it, demonstrate that this was a strongly held belief relevant to the
legislation being discussed. 97 Not every filibuster prior to the pre-1970s
reform was based on a similar level of conviction; some were instead
based upon purely political concerns.98 Nevertheless, because the 1970s
reforms made filibustering easier, they allowed for more frequent
filibusters on noncontroversial issues 99 and holds placed on
noncontroversial nominations. 00
In 2009, for instance, Senators Pat Roberts (R-KS) and Sam
Brownback (R-KS) placed a hold on the nomination of thenRepresentative John McHugh (R-NY) to be the Secretary of the
Army) 0 1 This was not because they had any particular misgivings about
Representative McHugh, who was in fact a fellow Republican, but
because they were concerned that President Obama was planning on
transferring inmates from Guantanamo Bay to detention facilities in
94. See Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama
Announces
Recess Appointments
to Key Admin.
Positions (Mar. 27, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-keyadministration-positions.
95. See supratext accompanying notes 33-36.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 99-112.
97. See generally Thurmond Holds Recordfor Senate Filibustering, Fox NEWS (June 27,
2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,90552,00.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 13, at 83-92 (arguing that while partisan filibusters have
certainly increased over the years, they are not an entirely new development).
99. See The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 147 (statement of Hon.
Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP); Press Release, Leahy, supra note 8 (discussing the
filibusters of noncontroversial judicial nominees).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 101-07.
101. The FilibusterToday andIts Consequences, supranote 3; at 164-65 (statement of Sen. Pat
Roberts, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.); Blake, supranote 66.
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10 2
Kansas, and they wanted assurances that this would not happen.
Senator Roberts even implied that he preferred handling the issue of
transferring Guantanamo inmates to Kansas by placing a hold on
Representative McHugh, as opposed to introducing an amendment
blocking the transfer, because he thought he might lose the vote on such
a measure. 10 3 Senator Roberts claims he lifted the hold after he "got what
he could not disclose on the grounds of
[he] needed," information
04
confidentiality.1
Another modem Senate hold that drew controversy was a "blanket
hold" that Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) placed on all of President
Obama's pending nominations at that time.10 5 Senator Shelby placed this
hold not because he had any particular objections to the actual nominees,
but because he was upset that the Government Accountability Office had
halted a contract for a refueling tanker that would have been built in
Senator Shelby's home state. 1 6 Under fire from his colleagues and from
even conservative pundits, Senator Shelby eventually relented and lifted
the hold.'0 7
Similar to holds on nominees used to extract concessions on
unrelated matters, filibusters have been used on noncontroversial
nominations for the apparent reason of using up debate time.' 0 8 A
particularly noteworthy example of this practice took place during the
nomination of Barbara Keenan for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. 0 9 A Senator used an anonymous hold to block her from a
roll call vote, forcing a vote of cloture." 0 When the vote was held,
however, she was confirmed unanimously, indicating there had never
really been any opposition to her."' Keenan was not alone in

102. The FilibusterToday and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 164-65 (statement of Sen. Pat
Roberts, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.); Blake, supra note 66.
103. The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 165 (statement of Sen. Pat
Roberts, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.) ("I certainly didn't want a vote on the Senate
floor, where a vote could go the other way and then that puts it in cement and then you have lost the
issue.").
104. Id. (statement of Sen. Pat Roberts, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.).
105. Wallbank, supranote 36.
106. Id.
107.

See Ed Morrisey, Shelby Places Blanket Hold on Obama Nominees, HOT AIR (Feb. 5,

2010, 12:16 PM), http://hotair.com/archives/2010/02/05/shelby-places-blanket-hold-on-obamanominees/ ("It isn't at all legitimate to hold up every single appointment to demand more pork for
one's state, or favorable bid decisions, or any other gimme impulse. ... [A] hold should focus on a
specific policy point associated with the nomination or on a critical issue of national security.");
Wallbank, supranote 36.
108. See, e.g., Clevenger, supra note 4.
109. See id.
110. Id.
11.

See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss3/6

12

Hamm: Modifying the Filibuster: A Means to Foster Bipartisanship While

2012]

MODIFYING THE FILIBUSTER

experiencing this kind of delay; many of President Obama's other
judicial nominees saw their nominations delayed substantially because
of filibusters, only to be confirmed with little to no opposition.' 2
Even when the filibuster is used to extract concessions that are at
least relevant to the issue being debated, it still can seem like a form of
extortion when used by Senators to extract funding for local causes in
exchange for votes on issues of national significance. 113 A particularly
notorious recent example was the so-called "Comhusker Kickback,"
which gave Nebraska an exemption from having to pay the state share of
Medicaid expansion in a pending healthcare reform bill. 114 This
exemption was apparently granted to gain the vote of Nebraska's
Democratic Senator, Ben Nelson, 1 5 though his office later denied that
this was the reason for the provision. 1 6 Amidst criticism, the provision
was eventually removed.117
C. "Because I Feel Like It:"
Senators Use the FilibusterEven When They Do Not Know Why
Another problem with the ease with which the current filibuster can
be used is that it empowers Senators to stop legislation they purport to
oppose, even when they do not really appear to know why it is they
oppose it.11 8 In 2010, Senator Scott Brown (R-MA) threatened to oppose
a financial reform bill and initially voted against cloture on the bill.119
When asked why he opposed the bill, however, he failed to articulate a
reason, instead reflecting the question back to the interviewer and
asking, "Well, what areas do you think should be fixed? I mean.., tell
me. ' 120 Senator Brown eventually relented and voted for cloture, 12 but
112. See Press Release, Leahy, supra note 8 (discussing at length the various noncontroversial
nominees who nevertheless saw their nominations held up through parliamentary maneuvers).
113. See Chris Frates, Payoffs for States Get Reid to 60, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2009, 7:56 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30815.html (discussing various incentives given to
Senators to convince them to vote for a health care reform bill; many of these incentives seem
tailored to the local interests of those Senators).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Jordan Fabian, Obama Healthcare Plan Nixes Ben Nelson's "'CornhuskerKickback"
Deal, HILL (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/82621obama-healthcare-plan-nixes-ben-nelsons-comhusker-kickback-deal.
117. Id.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 119-27.
119. See Jonathan Karl, Sen. Harry Reid Suggests Sen. Scott Brown Lied, ABC NEWS (May 19,
2010, 5:52 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/05/sen-harry-reid-suggests-sen-scottbrown-lied/ (detailing Senator Brown's vote against cloture on the bill); Matt Viser, Brown Opposes
Current Financial Bill, BOSTON (Apr. 14, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/
politicalintelligence/2010/04/brown opposes c.html.
120. See Viser, supranote 119.
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given his inability to articulate the reasons he opposed the bill, it seems
apparent he had used the filibuster here on an issue he did not genuinely
feel strongly about. 12
A similar situation arose during the health care debate of 2009, in
which Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) 123 repeatedly objected to the
124
inclusion of a provision creating a public health insurance option.
Over a period of months, Senator Lieberman gave various reasons for
his opposition to the public option, none of which held up to much
scrutiny, causing him to constantly change his rationale. 125 Despite
Senator Lieberman's inability to give a coherent rationale for why he
opposed the public option, he nevertheless threatened to filibuster the
bill over the inclusion of the provision,12 6 and the Senate majority was
eventually forced to drop the provision because it needed his vote. 127
D. Negotiating With Scorpions.:
IncreasedPolarizationHas Made Invoking Cloture Harder
One argument often made in favor of keeping the filibuster is that it
encourages deal-making and bipartisanship, as the majority party will
often need support from at least someone in the minority party to pass
legislation. 2 8 However, over the years, the two parties have become
increasingly polarized, including in the U.S. Senate. 129 As the parties
grow more polarized, it becomes harder to broker deals, and by

121. See Daniel Indiviglio, Scott Brown Helps Democrats Push Through Financial Reform,
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2010, 3:53 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/05/scottbrown-helps-democrats-push-through-financial-reform/57041/.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
123. Biography, JOE LIEBERMAN: U.S. SENATOR FOR CONN., http://lieberman.senate.gov/index
.cfim/about-joe/biography (last visited July 27, 2012) (noting that Senator Lieberman is an
"Independent Democrat").
124. See Steve Benen, Lieberman's On to Reason #7, WASH. MONTHLY (Dec. 9, 2009, 10:40
AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2009_12/02131 1.php; Brian Beutler,
Lieberman: Sure, I'd FilibusterA Health Care Reform Bill With A PublicOption, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (Oct. 27, 2009, 1:25 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/10/lieberman-sure-idfilibuster-a-health-care-reform-bill.php?ref=fpblg; Angie Drobnic Holan, The Truth-O-Meter and
the Health Care Debate of 2009, POLITIFACT (Dec. 29, 2009, 3:38 PM), http://www.politifact.com
/truth-o-meter/article/2009/dec/29/health-care-debate-2009/.
125. See Benen, supra note 124.
126. Beutler, supra note 124.
127. See E.J. Dionne, The Public Option Died Last Summer, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2009,
11:02 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2009/12/the_public-option died-last.
html.
128. See The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 143 (statement of Hon.
Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
129. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (May 10, 2012),
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp.
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extension, harder to invoke cloture. 130 It is noteworthy, however, that
even though the increased polarization in the Senate makes it harder to
broker deals and overcome the sixty-vote threshold required to invoke
cloture,' 3 ' the modem Senate has nevertheless overcome this threshold
132
and enacted legislation with bipartisan support on multiple occasions.
E. The Vanishing Judiciary:
Has Left Many Vacancies on the Bench
System
Current
The
A further problem with the current system of filibusters and holds is
that it has led to a high number of vacancies that remain unfilled on the
bench. 133 Approaching the end of President Obama's second year in34
1
office, only forty percent of his judicial nominees had been confirmed.
By contrast, at similar points in their presidencies, President Obama's
immediate predecessors, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, had seventyseven and ninety percent of their judicial nominees, respectively,
confirmed. 135 President Obama's nominees averaged 169 days pending
from nomination to confirmation, including an average of 150 days for
nominees ultimately confirmed without opposition. 136 Judicial nominees
Joseph Greenaway and James Wynn both waited over 200 days for their
confirmation votes, only to be confirmed without opposition. 37 Delays
like this have resulted in a high number of vacancies on the bench.' 3 8 In
December 2010, there were 110 federal court vacancies-more than
twelve percent of the entire federal judiciary. 3 9

130. See The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 157-58 (statement of
Sen. Tom Udall, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 129-30.
132. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Senate Ends Military Ban on Gays Serving Openly, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2010, at 1; Matthew Jaffe, Obama Hails Senate Passage of Wall Street Overhaul, ABC
NEWS (July 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wall-street-overhaul-rolls-final-passagesenate/story?id= 1170998.
133. Press Release, Leahy, supra note 8.
134. ALLIANCE FOR JUST., supra note 43, at 2; Kimberly Schwandt, 2010 Rewind: Moments
that Marked Obama's Second Year in Office, Fox NEWS (Dec. 30, 2010), http://politics.blogs.fox
news.com/2010/12/30/2010-rewind-moments-marked-obamas-second-year-office.
135.

ALLIANCE FOR JUST., supra note 43, at 2.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 1.
See id. at 2.
Id.
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PROPOSED AND ENACTED FILIBUSTER AND HOLD REFORMS

This Part will discuss recent reforms to the filibuster and proposals
for more reforms going forward. A series of reforms were enacted in
2011,140 but other reform proposals were specifically rejected, 141 and
42
many other proposals for filibuster reform have yet to receive a vote. 1
Additional reform proposals have been made which address the Senate
hold specifically. 143 Admittedly, there are considerable obstacles to
reforming the filibuster. 144 But if additional
reforms are not made, abuse
45
continue.
to
likely
is
practice
the
of
A. The Senate Acts: Recently Enacted Reforms to the System
Between the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, the Senate
146
looked at numerous proposed reforms to both holds and filibusters.
All Democrats who returned to the Senate in 2011 from the previous
session of Congress signed a letter to Majority Leader Harry Reid (DNV) urging reforms to the filibuster. 4 But there was skepticism and
pushback as well: outgoing Democratic Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT)
148
cautioned the Senate against "unwise" rule changes to the filibuster,
and a spokesman for Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) warned
that Democrats would come to regret changes to the rules should they
find themselves in the minority some day. 149 These reform efforts came
to a culmination on January 27, 2011, when votes were held on several
proposed reforms. 5 ° The Senate passed
some modest rule reforms, but
5
voted down more substantial ones.' '

140. See infra Part IV.A.
141. See infra Part IV.B.
142. See infra Part IV.C.
143. See infra Part IV.D.
144. See infra Part IV.E.
145. See infra Part 1V.F.
146. See, e.g., Dan Friedman, Senate's Returning Democrats Unanimously Favor Filibuster
Reform, NAT'L J. (Dec. 23, 2010, 11:24 AM), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/congress/senate-sGreg Sargent, Harry Reid
retuming-democrats-unanimously-favor-filibuster-reform-20101222;
Sure Sounds Serious About FilibusterReform, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://voices.

washingtonpost.com/plum-line/20 11/0 1/harry reid sure sounds serious.html.
147.
148.

Friedman, supra note 146.
J. Taylor Rushing, Dodd Says Senate Should Keep Filibuster, HILL (Nov. 30, 2010,

8:59 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/131277-in-farewell-dodd-says-senate-should-keepfilibuster.
149.
150.

Friedman, supra note 146.
157 CONG. REc. S295, S326-29 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011).

151. See Carl Hulse, Senate Approves Changes Intended to Ease Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2011, at A20.
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One Senate rule reform that passed was a resolution abolishing the
secret hold by prescribing specific language that people intending to
place a hold must use. 152 A Senator intending to place a hold must now
submit a notice of intent to an appropriate Senate leader, stating that, "I,
. I will submit a
Senator ___ , intend to object to _
, dated
copy of this notice to the Legislative Clerk and the Congressional
Record within [two] session days and I give my permission to the
objecting Senator to object in my name."' 53 Furthermore, a Senator
objecting on the Senate floor itself must state, "I object to __ , on
behalf of Senator __,,
54 The Senate also passed a rule limiting the
stalling tactic of reading a bill on the floor in its entirety, as long as the
law has been publicly available for a given period of time. '
In addition to these formal resolutions, the Senate also reached
some more informal agreements to modify the filibuster." 6 Senators
Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) pledged to work
together to introduce a bill to reduce the number of federal government
positions requiring Senate confirmation.' 57 Senator Schumer later
introduced the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining
Act of 2011, which encompassed these goals. 158 The Senate
subsequently passed the bill, on a vote of 79-20, but it has not yet passed
the House of Representatives. 5 9 Another filibuster reform was agreed to
via a "handshake deal" between Minority Leader McConnell and
Majority Leader Reid. 160 The majority party agreed to limit the use of
"fill[ing] the amendment tree," a parliamentary maneuver used to
prevent the minority party from offering amendments,' 61 in exchange for

152. See S. Res. 28, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011) (enacted).
153. Id. § l(a)(3).
154. Id. § l(a)(4).
155. See S. Res. 29, 112th Cong. § 1(b) (2011) (enacted); Hulse, supranote 151, at A20.
156. Paul Kane, Senate Leaders Agree on Changes in Filibuster, Confirmation Process,
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2011, at A5.

157. See id.
158. See Presidential Appointment Efficiency. and Streamlining Act of 2011, S. 679, 112th
Cong. (2011); Ed Feulner, Wrong Way to Speed Up Nominations: Cutting Out Senate Approval
Would Subvert the Founders'Intent,WASH. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at B3.
159. See Carl Hulse, Senate Votes to Streamline the Confirmation Process, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2011, at A18; S. 679: PresidentialAppointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011,
GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/l12/s679 (last visited July 27, 2012).
160. Kane, supra note 156, at A5.
161. See GOLD, supra note 19, at 102; see also Mark Strand, Filling the Tree, CONG. INST.
(June 12, 2008), http://www.conginst.org/index.php?option=com-myblog&show=Filling-theTree.html&ltemid=26 (discussing how the Majority Leader can "fill the amendment tree" and
prevent the minority from offering amendments to legislation by offering his or her own, even if
they are inconsequential in substance, because the Majority Leader is given precedence for
introducing amendments and because most bills have a set limit of amendments that are allowed).
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to limit filibustering matters from even
the minority party's agreement
162
coming up for debate.
B.

The Senate Punts: Additional ProposalsThat Were Voted Down

While the Senate did implement the previously discussed filibuster
reforms, several other reform ideas were voted down. 163 Senator Tom
Harkin (D-IA) proposed one such reform idea (the "Harkin
Proposal").' 64 According to the Harkin Proposal, an initial sixty-vote
threshold for invoking cloture would be preserved, but upon failure to
invoke cloture, a Senator could file another cloture motion. 165 Two days
later, the Senate could vote again on the issue, but this time, the
threshold for invoking cloture would be reduced by three votes to fiftyseven votes. 166 If that vote failed, the process would repeat itself: a
Senator could file for another cloture motion, and after two days, the
vote could be held, with the threshold for cloture once again being
reduced by three votes. 167 The process would continue, until eventually
cloture could be invoked with a simple majority of fifty-one votes. 168 In
addition to its support within the Senate, this proposal has received
support from outside the Senate chamber from congressional scholars,
including Sarah Binder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 169
The Senate voted on the Harkin Proposal in January 2011, and it
failed decisively. 170 Only twelve Senators, all of them Democrats, voted
for the proposal, whereas eighty-four Senators, including every
Republican and a strong majority of Democrats, voted against it.', The
ultimate ability under the Harkin Proposal to pass legislation on a simple
majority vote was likely a deal-breaker for many Senators. 72 For
instance, leaders Reid and McConnell were both adamant that a
162. Kane, supranote 156, at A5.
163. Hulse, supra note 151, at A20.
164. See Christinia Crippes, Harkin FilibusterEffort Falls Flat, HAWK EYE, Jan. 29, 2011, at
IA.
165. Tom Harkin, Filibuster Reform: Curbing Abuse to Prevent Minority Tyranny in the
Senate, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 7-8 (2011).

166. Id. at8.
167. Id.
168.

Id.

169. See S. Res. 8, 112th Cong. (2011) (demonstrating that S. Res 8 is the Harkin Proposal);
Rigdon, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing Binder's support); On the Resolution (S. Res. 8), U.S.
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfin.cfin?congress=
SENATE,
112&session=l&vote=00004 (last visited July 27, 2012) (showing support for S. Res 8 in the

Senate).
170.
171.
172.

See 157 CONG. REC. S295, S327 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011).
Id.; On the Resolution (S. Res. 8), supra note 169.
See Crippes, supra note 164, at IA; Kane, supra note 156, at A5.
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1 73
supermajority requirement to invoke cloture should not be changed.
As long as there is bipartisan agreement in the Senate that invoking
cloture should require something more than a majority, proposals like
will likely continue to be voted down by large
Senator Harkin's
74

margins.1

Two additional proposals for filibuster reform that were defeated in
2011 would have required that filibusterers talk continuously (Mr.
Smith-style). 75 In one of the proposals, the rules would be changed so
that if the Senate failed to obtain three-fifths of the Senate to vote for
cloture, the Senate would then enter a period of continuous debate until
no Senator sought recognition to speak, at which point cloture would be
deemed invoked. 176 The second proposal was more complex, but the
essential goal was the same: once no Senator sought recognition, the
Senate could pass the bill on a majority vote. 177 While these two
proposals received more support than the Harkin proposal, they too were
78
defeated, receiving only forty-four and forty-six votes, respectively. 1 179
While resurrecting Mr. Smith-style filibusters may be appealing
(and indeed, such filibusters do still occasionally occur),18 0 it is worth
remembering that two-tracking was formulated to reduce them for a
reason. 181 Two-tracking was created because compelling filibusters to be
182
done in "Mr. Smith-style" often led to a backlog of Senate business.

173. Kane, supra note 156, at A5.
174. See S. Res. 8, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011) (outlining how the Harkin Proposal would allow
legislation to pass on a majority vote); Kane, supra note 156, at A5 (showing that both the Senate
Majority and Minority leaders oppose such a plan); On the Resolution (S. Res. 8), supra note 169
(showing a majority of Senators in both parties opposing such a plan).
175. See, e.g., Reid Pillifant, Gillibrand Wants to Bring Mr. Smith Back to Washington, N.Y.
OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://www.observer.com/201 1/politics/gillibrand-wants-bringmr-smith-back-washington; see S. Res. 10, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011); S. Res. 21, 112th Cong. § 1
(2011); On the Resolution (S. Res. 10 As Amended), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?congress=112&session=l&vote=00005
(last
visited July 27, 2012); On the Resolution (S. Res. 21 As Amended), U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfn.cfm?congress=1 12&sessio
n=l&vote=00006 (last visited July 27, 2012).
176. S. Res. 10.
177. S.Res.21.
178. On the Resolution (S. Res. 8), supranote 169; On the Resolution (S. Res. 10 As Amended),
supranote 175; On the Resolution (S. Res. 21 As Amended), supranote 175.
179. See S. Res. 10; On the Resolution (S. Res. 10 As Amended), supra note 175 (showing that
forty-four Senators supported such a proposal).
180. Alexandra Petri, [Updated] Filibernieand Mr. Smith: Is Senator Bernie Sanders Still
Filibustering? Yes!, COMPOST (Dec. 10, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/compost/2010/12/filibemie and mr smith is sen.html.
181. See The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 147 (statement of Hon.
Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
182. Seeid.
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Any filibuster reform that compels filibusterers to engage in marathon
talking sessions would likely lead to a183return of the very problems that
two-tracking was designed to prevent.
Steven S. Smith, Director of the Weidenbaum Center on the
Economy, Government, and Public Policy at Washington University in
St. Louis,' 84 is likewise skeptical of such a plan.185 According to Director
Smith, simply making obstruction more difficult would have only a
marginal effect on the amount of obstruction because most Senators who
vote against cloture have already calculated that obstruction is good
politics for them, and making their obstruction more visible would not
affect that calculation.1 86 Director Smith further believes that when the
majority party faces such a filibuster, it will be subjected to just as much
outside criticism as the minority, as it will inevitably be portrayed as
unwilling to compromise and be accused of misplaced priorities by
sidelining more important issues in favor of forcing the filibuster.' 87
Finally, Director Smith concludes by noting that the last time a Majority
Leader forced a Mr. Smith-style filibuster, it was unsuccessful in
ultimately getting the legislation passed. 88 A 1987 campaign finance
reform bill was subjected to seven cloture votes, yet the most votes in
favor of cloture were on the first vote, with absentees causing the total
number of votes in favor of cloture to decrease on subsequent votes. 8 9
Thus, simply bringing back Mr. Smith-style filibusters is a flawed
remedy to the current problem.' 90
C. Outside of the Box:
Additional FilibusterReform Proposals
There are several additional filibuster reform proposals beyond
those discussed in the previous Section. 191 One such proposal, advocated
by former Vice President Walter Mondale, would reduce the number of
votes required to invoke cloture but still require more than a majority
(i.e., it can be invoked with somewhere between fifty-five and fifty-eight
votes, lower than the current sixty-vote threshold, but still more than just

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id
Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome, ISSUES GOVERNANCE STUD., June 2010, at 1, 2.
Id. at 22-23.
See id. at 22.
Id. at23.
See id
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
See infra text accompanying notes 192-253.
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a majority). 192 Vice President Mondale, who was influential in creating
the sixty-vote requirement during the 1970s filibuster reforms, argues
that the threshold for invoking cloture should "assure deliberation and
prevent debilitation," and that while the sixty-vote threshold was a good
number for meeting this middle ground in the 1970s, it193is too high a
threshold in today's more "harshly partisan" environment.
Gerard N. Magliocca, a professor of law at Indiana University,
Robert H. McKinney School of Law, 194 has made a different proposal
for filibuster reform: turn it into a suspensory veto that the majority can
override after one year has expired.' 95 Under this proposal, modeled
after the rules of the United Kingdom's House of Lords, the minority's
power to resist legislation would be weakened, but it would "retain the
benefits of extended debate."' 96 The underlying justifications for such a
reform are that it would: (1) improve debate because the minority would
know that they needed to eventually bring over majority Senators to
their cause to defeat the bill permanently; (2) in some cases, give the
voters a chance to influence the bill because an election would take place
during the year in which the bill was being delayed; and (3) allow the
general populace to infer that the pieces of legislation offered earliest 1in
97
the session by the majority party were that party's highest priorities.
However, Professor Magliocca recognizes potential shortcomings to this
reform. 198 Legislation which is introduced with less than a year left in
the Congressional session might be barred from passing until the next
session began, at which point the one-year clock would need to be
restarted, unless the Senate were to also amend its rules allowing bills to
pass over successive sessions. 199
Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO) has proposed several ways to
reform the filibuster (the "Bennet Proposal"), including substantive
20
One important element
changes to the cloture-threshold requirement.

192.

The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 144, 146-47 (statement of

Hon. Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
193. Id at 146-47; Eric Black, Fixing the Filibuster Problem: What Mondale Would Do,
MINNPOST (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2010/02/fixing-filibusterproblem-what-mondale-would-do.
194. Gerald R. Magliocca, IND. U., http://indylaw.indiana.edu/people/profile.cfm?Id=40 (last
visited July 27, 2012).
195. Gerald R. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 303, 316 (2011).
196. Id. at316-17.
197. Seeid. at318.
198. Seeid. at318-19.
199. Id
200. See S.Res. 440, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2010); Colorado: Sen. Michael Bennet (D), NAT'L J.,
(last visited July 27,
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/almanac/2010/person/michael-bennet-co/
2012).
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of his proposal is that it requires "forty-one hundredths of the Senators
duly chosen and sworn" to vote against cloture in order to prevent it
from being invoked, as opposed to requiring sixty Senators to invoke
it.201 Furthermore, this threshold can change if there are multiple cloture
votes and the majority party is able to convince some Senators in the
minority party to support cloture.20 2 Under the Bennet Proposal, after
three failed cloture votes, the threshold for preventing the invocation of
cloture would be raised to forty-five "hundredths of the Senators duly
chosen and sworn," unless the minority party can persuade at least one
member of the majority party to vote against cloture.20 3 If the minority
party persuades a majority party Senator to do so, the threshold is
reduced back to forty-one, unless the majority party can similarly
persuade three members of the minority party to vote for cloture, at
which point it would be raised again to forty-five votes.2 °4 Senator
Bennet testified before the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration in support of his plan in July 2010,205 but it died after it
206
was referred to Committee.
The Bennet Proposal has two strong attributes.20 7 First, its
requirement that the minority prevent cloture from being invoked, as
opposed to requiring the majority to invoke it, would help put the onus
of a filibuster back on the minority.208 Under such a rule, cloture would
have been successfully invoked on the first vote for the Hurricane Irene
supplemental bill and the nomination of Craig Becker to the NLRB, both
of which received only thirty-three votes in opposition to cloture.20 9
Even prominent supporters of the filibuster, such as Professor Gregory
Koger, have argued in favor of implementing a similar reform.210
Second, the Bennet proposal's variable thresholds for the invocation of
cloture would give both parties incentives to foster compromise and
encourage Senators from the other party ("converts") to support the
opposing cause. 211 Senators in the minority party will want Senators in
the majority party to support their cause because it will keep the
201. S. Res. 440 § 2(c) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. See id. § 2(d).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Press Release, Bennet, supranote 5.
206. S. Res. 440 (111 th): A Resolution Improving the Senate Cloture Process, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 1I /sres440 (last visited July 27, 2012).
207. See infra text accompanying notes 208-12.
208. Press Release, Bennet, supra note 5 ("If you want to block the majority from moving
ahead, then you at least ought to be required to show up for the vote.").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
210. See Rigdon, supra note 7, at 26.
211. See Press Release, Bennet, supranote 5.
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threshold for preventing the invocation of cloture at forty-one votes, and
the majority party will want to get the support from Senators in the
minority party because it could increase that requirement back to fortyfive votes.212
However, elements of the plan are flawed.2 13 The requirement that
the minority party needs only one majority party convert to reduce the
number of votes needed to invoke cloture, whereas the majority party
needs three minority party converts to raise it again, is
counterintuitive.214 Simple math dictates that the minority party will
have a wider range of potential converts to target than the majority party
would. In a Senate with fifty-four majority party Senators and forty-six
minority party Senators, for instance, the minority party will have fiftyfour Senators to target as potential converts, whereas a majority party
only has forty-six Senators to target. Furthermore, the rigidity of the
Bennet Proposal's numbers would give vastly disproportionate influence
to converts in some situations.2 15 Under the Bennet Proposal, a single
majority party Senator voting against cloture could reduce the cloturevote requirement by a full four votes, from forty-five votes to fortyone.2 16 Similarly, the third minority party Senator to vote for cloture
would increase the cloture requirement from forty-one votes back to
forty-five votes, a similar full four-vote increase.21 7
Other filibuster reform proposals would limit the kinds of Senate
business that can be subjected to filibusters. 1 8 No Labels, a bipartisan
organization with various proposals to reform the federal government,
has noted that under current Senate rules, Senators can filibuster both the
motion to proceed to debating the issue and the substantive issue
itself.219 The organization supports banning the use of the filibuster on
that such a reform alone could "cut the
the motion to proceed, arguing
220
number of filibusters in half.,

212. See id.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 214-17.
214. See ELLEN WEISBORD, BRUCE H. CHARNOV, & JONATHAN LINDSEY, MANAGING PEOPLE
IN TODAY'S LAW FIRM: THE HUMAN RESOURCES APPROACH TO SURVIVING CHANGE 98 (1995);
Group Dynamics, BRIAN MAC, http://www.brianmac.co.uk/group.htm (last visited July 27, 2012).
215. See infra text accompanying notes 216-17.
216. S. Res. 440 § 2(d) (2010).
217. Id.
218. See Steven S. Smith & Kate M. Gregg, Reporter's Guide to FilibusterReform in the U.S.
Senate, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://news.wustl.edu/Documents/Record/Reporter's Guide to
Filibuster Reform.pdf(last visited July 27, 2012).
219. See No LABELS, MAKE CONGRESS WORK!: A No LABELS ACTION PLAN TO CHANGE THE
RULES AND Fix WHAT'S BROKEN 2, 10, available at http://nolabels.3cdn.net/91487f08fcfc

87870a_p2m6iii9t.pdf.
220. Id.at 10.
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Along these same lines, some commentators have proposed to limit
the amount of time allotted for debate after a motion to proceed."'
Senate Resolution 10, one of the proposals to enact the Mr. Smith-style
approach to filibusters, 222 reduced the duration of post-cloture debate on
nominations to only two hours.223 Such a plan, however, does not
differentiate between a genuinely controversial nominee like David
Hamilton, 224 and an uncontroversial one like Barbara Keenan 2 25-both
would receive two hours of post-cloture debate. 6 Moreover, it is not
clear this reform could seriously address the issue of blanket holds: if
every nominee is given two hours of post-cloture debate, placing holds
on large swathes of nominees would still force the Senate to spend
227
substantial amounts of time invoking cloture on all nominees.
The Bennet Proposal has a different post-cloture debate time frame
that more explicitly ties the amount of debate time to how controversial
the issue is, which could help to diffuse these particular problems. 8
Under the Bennet Proposal, three-fifths of the Senate may vote to reduce
the thirty-hour debate time requirement on given issues. 22 9 However,
such a proposal might go too far toward the reduction of debate time.
Elizabeth Rybicki, an analyst on Congress and legislative process for the
Congressional Research Service, has suggested that, in connection with
other elements of the Bennet Proposal and with current Senate rules,
such a provision could allow the Senate to pass legislation with a twothirds vote and no debate time.230
Some commentators have also argued that the filibuster's use on
substantive issues thought to be "important to the exercise of the
Senate's constitutional powers" should be limited. 23i The filibustering of

221.

See, e.g., The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 146 (statement of

Hon. Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
222. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
223. S. Res 10, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011).
224.

Cristina Corbin, Obama's First Judicial Nomination Re-Ignites Controversy Ahead of

Vote, Fox NEWS (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/1 1/05/vote-nears-obamasjudicial-nominee-stirs-controversy/; see supra text accompanying note 58.
225. See supratext accompanying notes 108-11.
226. See S. Res 10 § 5.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65 (describing how the Senate hold derives its
power from the amount of debate time allotted in the event of a cloture vote).
228. See S. Res. 440, 111 th Cong. § 2(b) (2010).
229. Id.
230. See Examining the Filibuster: Legislative Proposals to Change Senate Procedures:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 1llth Cong. 403-04 (2010) (statement of

Elizabeth Rybicki, Analyst on the Congressional & Legislative Process, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
231. Smith & Gregg, supra note 218.
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judicial nominations has often proven to be particularly controversial.2 32
In 2005, some Senate Republicans sought to end judicial filibustering.2 33
Similarly, in his 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama
called on the Senate to give "all judicial and public service
nominations ...[an] up or down vote within 90 days. 234 No Labels
argues for putting real teeth into such a ninety-day requirement, stating
that Senate rules should be amended so that if a nominee is not
confirmed or rejected on an up or down
vote within ninety days, the
235
nominee would be confirmed by default.
Finally, and perhaps most radically, some argue for the complete
abolition of the filibuster. 36 Pundit Ezra Klein has argued that true
bipartisanship in the Senate no longer exists. In today's environment, it
makes sense politically for the minority party to attempt to thwart the
majority party as often as possible, and the filibuster makes it too
difficult for the majority party to govern successfully. 237 While it may be
true that there is increased partisanship in Congress, and that in such an
environment the filibuster may make governing exponentially harder,
Congress has nevertheless continued to pass bipartisan legislation,
undermining any assertions that bipartisanship is truly impossible. 231 If
one does value the idea of compromise, a proposal like Senator
Bennet's, which alters the number of votes needed to invoke cloture
depending on the abilities of both the majority and minority parties to
bring converts to their cause, would more effectively balance
compromise and effective governance than would a complete abolition
of the filibuster.239
Emmet J. Bondurant, a partner with Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore,
LLP in Atlanta, Georgia,24 ° goes even further than Mr. Klein.24' Mr.
Bondurant believes the filibuster, as it is currently practiced, is

232. See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 53, at 29 (discussing an attempt to ban the use of filibusters on
judicial nominations).
233. Id.
234. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Obama, State of the Union], available at http://www.white
house.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/25/2012-state-union-address-enhanced-version#
transcript.
235. NO LABELS, supra note 219, at 9.
236. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 8.
237. Id.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
239. See S.Res. 440, 111 th Cong. § 2(d) (2010).
240. Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster:The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 467,467 & n.* (2011).
241. See generally id. (arguing that the filibuster is unconstitutional).
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unconstitutional. 242 He argues that a sixty-vote requirement is
unconstitutional in seven different ways, among them that the
Constitution specifically enumerated issues which required a
supermajority to pass and that the document was written under a
presumption that all other issues would be decided by a simple
majority.24 3 Mr. Bondurant subsequently agreed to represent the
government watchdog group Common Cause in their lawsuit against the
U.S. Senate, which alleges that the filibuster "violates the principle of
majority rule" and is unconstitutional.2 4
Others dispute the idea that the filibuster is unconstitutional.245
Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky, both professors of law at
University of California, Irvine School of Law,246 argue that "[b]ecause
the text [of the Constitution] is silent about the [number of] vote[s]
needed to stop debate or pass a law, Congress has the option to set the
voting requirement," and the enumeration of supermajority requirements
elsewhere does not mean that only those issues can constitutionally
require a supermajority vote.247 John 0. McGinnis, a Professor of Law at
Northwestern University School of Law, 248 and Michael B. Rappaport,249a
Professor of Law at the University of San Diego School of Law,
agree.25 ° Professors McGinnis and Rappaport state that no one would
seriously argue, for instance, that the Constitution's requirement that a
President address Congress on the "State of the Union" means that he is
constitutionally prohibited from addressing Congress on other matters. 251
Similarly, the constitutionally-mandated supermajority requirements for
some issues do not mean that all other supermajority requirements are
unconstitutional. 25 2 Regardless of how the Supreme Court would
242. Id. at 480.
243. See id. at 479-82.
244. Kitty Felde, Common Cause Challenges the Senate Filibuster in Court over Dream Act
Being Blocked, 89.3 KPCC (May 15, 2012), http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/05/15/32437/lawsuittries-dump-filibuster/; Fix the Filibuster, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/site
/pp.asp?e=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=5958583 (last visited July 27, 2012).
245. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 240-45
(1997).
246. Catherine Fisk, SCH. L. U. CAL. IRVINE, http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/profile
c_fisk.html (last visited July 27, 2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, SCH. L. U. CAL. IRVINE,
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/pagel_e chemerinsky.html (last visited July 27, 2012).
247. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 245, at 240.
248. John 0. McGinnis, Nw. L., http://www.law.northwestem.edu/faculty/profiles/John
McGinnis/ (last visited July 27, 2012).
249. MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, http://www.profmikerappaport.com/ (last visited July 27, 2012).
250. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 488 (1995).
251. Id.
252. Id.
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ultimately rule if it was ever presented with a legal challenge to the
filibuster, the considerable debate as to the merits of such a case leave
the judiciary as a dubious avenue to enacting filibuster reform.253
D. Hold the FilibusterReform Please!.
Rule Reform Proposals That Address the Hold Specifically
There are also various proposals for rule reform that address only
the Senate hold and not the filibuster.254 One such proposal is to place a
time limit on holds.255 Senator Metzenbaum, notorious for his extensive
usage of the hold,256 nevertheless thought it should be limited, and stated
that, absent "special circumstances," a hold should expire after two
weeks.257 Various other proposals have been given for time limits on
holds, ranging anywhere from twenty-four hours to sixty days.258
Another proposal for hold reform is to require more than one Senator to
place a hold. 259 The Bennet Proposal contains such an element, requiring
that, for a hold to continue to be honored after two days from when the
original objection is made, at least one Senator from each party must
260
Others have suggested that as many
raise objections to the nominee.
as sixteen Senators should need to support a hold before it can be
honored.26
While these proposals might rein in some abuses of the hold,
because the hold is not formally created by the Senate rules but instead
262
derives its power from the filibuster, in many cases these proposals
could run into the same problems as did Senator Baker's decision to treat
holds as non-binding.263 If a Senator's hold is no longer recognized, the
Senator would still be able to use the filibuster, and the amount of debate
time it compels, to slow down significantly the passage of the issue. 26

253. See supra text accompanying notes 242-52.
254. See OLESZEK, supra note 62, at 3-12 (discussing various proposals to reform the hold,
almost none of which involve filibuster reform).
255. Id. at 3-4.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
257.

OLESZEK, supranote 62, at 4.

258. Id.
259. Id.at 11-12.
260. S. Res. 440, 111 th Cong. § 3(1) (2010).
261.

OLESZEK, supranote 62, at II -12.

262. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
263. See Waldman, supra note 5 (explaining how even if the Majority Leader chooses to go
ahead and force a Senate vote in spite of a hold, it can still use up significant amounts of debate
time); supra text accompanying notes 69-70; infra text accompanying note 264.
264. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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reform is a necessary component of any serious hold
Thus, filibuster
2 65
reform.
A potential way to weaken the hold through filibuster reform is to
reduce the amount of allotted post-cloture debate time on certain
266
matters. Senate Research 10's provision reducing the amount of postcloture debate on nominations to only two hours would help to
accomplish that goal.267 The hold on Representative McHugh's
nomination 26 is a good example of how this rule would work to diffuse
holds on noncontroversial nominations. 269 Assuming that Senators
Roberts and Brownback went through with their implied threat and
270
forced a cloture vote on the nomination, it would only force the Senate
to spend two hours debating the issue. 271 As such, the threat to filibuster
would have been less meaningful, and simply holding a vote on the
nomination would have been a much more viable option for the Majority
Leader.272 However, as discussed earlier, such a proposal runs the risk of
simply replacing the current practice of Senators placing holds on
individual nominees with Senators placing blanket holds on all
nominees.273
E. That Might Be a Problem: Obstacles to Reform
Despite the attention recently given to the importance of filibuster
reform, there remain many obstacles to any meaningful reform.274 One
of the most basic is that there is considerable incentive for both majority
party and minority party Senators to keep the status quo: the minority
party never wants to vote its power away, and the majority party is
always fearful about the diminished power it will have when it is the
minority party again.275 For majority party Senators, the fear of a lack of
power when they once again become the minority party often trumps
265. See supra text accompanying notes 262-64.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 268-72.
267. See S. Res. 10, 112th Cong. (2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 268-72.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-04.
269. See infra text accompanying notes 270-72.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65 (explaining how a hold usually involves an
implied threat to filibuster and why that is a deterrent to the Majority Leader from forcing a vote on
the matter).
271. SeeS.Res. 10.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (explaining that while the Majority Leader can
hold a vote on a matter in spite of a hold, he has incentive to refrain from doing so because of the
amount of time the Senator placing the hold can force the Senate to spend debating the matter).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 226-27.
274. See infra text accompanying notes 275-300.
275. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1054
(2011).
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their desire to implement their own agenda while they remain the
majority party.276 Furthermore, Senators have an individualistic interest
to preserve the filibuster because it makes them more powerful relative
to other government officials and increases the influence of "rank-andfile" Senators relative to Senate leaders.277 Majority party Senators may
also be wary of the political aesthetics of significant filibuster reforms:
attempts to change the Senate rules are sometimes framed as a "power
grab. 278
Furthermore, because both parties have used the filibuster for their
own ends in recent history, 279 anyone who calls for reforming the
process runs the risk of looking hypocritical. 280 For example, during the
debate over ending judicial filibusters in 2005, the unsuccessful
filibusters of judicial nominations that had occurred under President
Clinton became an object of contention. 2811 When Senate Majority
Leader Frist argued that the Democrats' filibustering of judicial
nominations was unprecedented, Senator Schumer pointed out that
Senator Frist himself had supported the filibuster of Richard Paez's
nomination to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 282 Senator Frist sought to differentiate between his judicial
filibuster and those of the Democrats, suggesting he had voted to
filibuster Judge Paez simply because he wanted more information about
the nominee. 283 Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) noted that Judge Paez did
ultimately get an up or down vote, and columnist Byron York further
argued that because the filibuster against Judge Paez was not successful
and received only a small number of votes, it should not be considered a

276. See Ezra Klein, Wonkbook: Filibuster Reform Dead, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2011, 6:45
AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/20 11/0 1/wonkbookfilibuster-reformdea.html
(discussing the concept of "loss aversion" and how people in general often fear the consequences of
loss more than they value the benefit of gains).
277. Bruhl, supra note 275, at 1054-55.
278. See Ezra Klein, Filibuster Reform and Power Grabs, WASH. POST (July 28, 2010, 12:23
PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/07/filibuster-reform-and-power-gr.html
(internal quotation marks omitted).
279. See, e.g., Obama, State of the Union, supra note 234 ("A simple majority is no longer
enough to get anything-even routine business-passed through the Senate .... Neither party has
been blameless in these tactics.").
280. See infra text accompanying notes 281-89.
281. Compare Byron York, What Sort of Filibustering Has Taken Place in the Senate, Where
Judicial Nominations are Concerned?, NAT'L REV., June 6, 2005, at 20, 22 (arguing that these
alleged filibusters were not actually filibusters), with Judd Legum, Frist Implodes on Senate Floor,
THINKPROGRESS.ORG (May 18, 2005, 11:06 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2005/05/18/906/
frist-implodes-of-senate-floor/ (presenting a counter-argument that these filibusters were in fact
filibusters).
282. Legum, supra note 281, at A9.
283. Id.
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filibuster.2 84 Others, however, have argued that an unsuccessful filibuster
is still a filibuster.2 85
Several years later, President Obama opened himself up to similar
criticisms of hypocrisy on judicial filibusters.2 86 During the 2005
filibuster reform debate, then-Senator Obama opposed banning judicial
filibusters, saying, "One day Democrats will be in the majority again,
and this rule change will be no fairer to a Republican minority than it is
to a Democratic minority.,' 287 Seven years later, after Senator Obama
had become President Obama, he reversed course and called for simple
up or down votes on judicial nominations. 8 8 Senator Comyn was then
quick to point out that when President Obama was a Senator, he had
himself voted for judicial filibusters and opposed Republican efforts to
ban them.289
The Senate rules themselves also contain significant hurdles for any
changes to the implementation of the filibuster. 290 Technically, a vote of
"two-thirds of the Senators present and voting" is needed to change a
Senate rule, 291 and Senate rules are binding on subsequent sessions of
Congress unless they are changed via this two-thirds vote requirement
("entrenchment").29 2 Exactly how big a procedural hurdle these rules
could be for filibuster reform, however, is unclear.293 There is debate as
to whether entrenchment is constitutional, 294 and the Senate has
apparently disregarded the two-thirds vote requirement and changed the
Senate's rules with a majority vote on multiple occasions.2 95 Indeed, the
rule was disregarded as recently as October 2011, when the Senate
284. Meredith Shiner & Humberto Sanchez, Senators Shy From Obama Filibuster Reform,
ROLL CALL, Jan. 26, 2012, at 3; York, supra note 281, at 22; Lies, Damn Lies and the Fight Over
Judicial Confirmations, CFIF (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/
current/inour opinion/nuclear-option-lies.htm.
285. Andrew Seifter, The Top 10 Filibuster Falsehoods, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (May 18,
2005, 1:45 PM), http://medianatters.org/research/2005/05/18/the-top-10-filibuster-falsehoods
/133217.
286. See infra text accompanying notes 287-89.
287. Shiner, supra note 284, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
288. See id.
289. Id. at 10.
290. See infra text accompanying notes 291-92.
291. Rules of the Senate: Precedence of Motions, supra note 89.
292. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 245, at 245; Rules of the Senate: Suspension and
Amendment of the Rules, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON RULES & ADMIN., http://www.rules.senate.
gov/public/index.cfn?p=RuleV (last visited July 27, 2012) ("The rules of the Senate shall continue
from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.").
293. See infra text accompanying notes 294-300.
294. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 245, at 247-52 (arguing that it is unconstitutional for one
legislature to bind subsequent sessions of that legislative body).
295. The Filibuster Today and Its Consequences, supra note 3, at 145-46 (statement of Hon.
Walter Mondale, Dorsey and Whitney LLP).
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changed the rules by a simple majority vote to limit the ability of
Senators to force votes on amendments after cloture has already been
invoked.296 Lastly, entrenchment could prove to be a blessing in disguise
for filibuster reform.297 One of the proposed methods of eliminating the
perception that filibuster reform is a "power grab" is for the Senate to
vote for filibuster reforms that would not take effect until a subsequent
session of Congress.298 Since neither party could be sure which party
would control Congress at that time, it would look more like a vote for
genuine principle, and less like a "power grab., 299 Senate rules that bind
subsequent sessions of Congress could play a key role in such an
approach, as it would bind subsequent Senates to the filibuster reforms
to which they agree.3 °0
The Bennet Proposal is in many respects more sensitive to these
reservations than other proposals to reform the filibuster. 30 1 The minority
party still has influence under the plan: as long as the minority party can
convince at least one majority party Senator to vote with them, they can
keep the threshold for invoking cloture at forty-one votes.30 2 Since the
minority party still has the ability to filibuster, implementing such a
reform resembles less of a "power grab" and blunts charges of hypocrisy
against Senators who have previously used the filibuster.30 3 Individual
and rank-and-file Senators would still be empowered (both in relation to
other government officials and against Senate leaders), as an individual
3°4
convert could alter the number of votes needed to invoke cloture.

296. Alexander Bolton, Reid Triggers "Nuclear Option" to Change Senate Rules, End Repeat
Filibusters, HILL
(Oct.
6,
2011,
9:10
PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
186133-reid-triggers-nuclear-option-to-change-senate-ruies-and-prhibit-pst-cloture-filibusters;
David Waldman, Sensationalist HeadlineAbout 'Nuclear Option'in the Senate! But Not Quite So,
DAILY

Kos (Oct.

6, 2011,

5:24 PM),

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/10/06/1023638/-

Sensationalist-headline-about-nuclear-option-in-the-Senate!-But-not-quite-so.
297. See infra text accompanying notes 299-301.
298. See Ezra Klein, Filibuster Follies, WASH. POST (July 26, 2010, 11:13 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/07/filibusterfollies.html.
299. See id ("[Such an approach] either phases [filibuster reform] in over the next few years or
begins six years from now, when we don't know who'll be in control.").
300. See Rules of the Senate: Suspension and Amendment of the Rules, supra note 292
(providing that the rules of the Senate continue from one session to the next, allowing a rule reform
passed in one session of Congress to be carried over into the next one).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06, 298-300; infra text accompanying notes 30204.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
303. See S. Res. 440, 11lth Cong. § 2(d) (2010).
304. See id.
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F. It Begins Again: FilibusterAbuse Has Continued
Despite the reforms voted for in early 2011, filibuster abuse has
continued. In December 2011, Republican Senators filibustered the
nomination of Richard Cordray to run the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.3 °5 What was disconcerting about this filibuster was
that Mr. Cordray was not filibustered because the Republicans had any
particular misgivings about the nominee himself, but because of their
grievances with the agency he was slated to run and their desire to have
the law creating the agency rewritten.30 6 Senate Historian Donald A.
Ritchie has stated that despite extensive searching of Senate history, he
could not find another historical case of Senators blocking a nomination
solely because they opposed the current structuring of the agency the
nominee was appointed to run.307 Mr. Cordray was eventually given the
post via a recess appointment,30 8 but the filibuster of the nominee for
reasons entirely unrelated to the nominee himself indicates there was no
extraordinary resistance to his nomination.3 °9
V.

PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE REFORMS

Future efforts to reform the filibuster will likely need to be
somewhat modest in scope to have a decent chance of passing. 310 Any
plan which would, eventually, automatically allow the Senate to pass
legislation and confirm nominees on a simple majority vote is likely to
be a non-sequitur, as witnessed by the dramatic failure of the Harkin
Proposal to pass.3 ' Senators from both parties have indicated a
willingness to support some types of reform; 312 but for any filibuster
305.

John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at B 1.

306. See id at B8 ("This is not about the nominee, who appears to be a decent person and may
well be qualified." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brian Darling, Richard Cordray,
the Filibuster and the CFPB, REDSTATE (Dec. 7, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.redstate.com/
brian d/2011/12/07/richard-cordray-the-filibuster-and-the-cfpb/ ("[T]he real motivation behind the
Republican filibuster is an effort to protect consumers from the CFPB.").
307. Sen. Sherrod Brown Says Republicans' Refusal to Confirm Richard Cordray to Head
Consumer Protection Bureau Was Unprecedented, POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2011, 6:00 PM),
http://www.politifact.com/ohio/statements/201 1/dee/12/sherrod-brown/sen-sherrod-brown-saysrepublicans-refusal-confirm/.
308. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A].

309. See supra text accompanying notes 305-08.
310. See supra Part W.E.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 163-74.
312. See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 53, at 29 (showing that many Senate Republicans were poised
to vote to abolish the use of filibusters on judicial nominees); Friedman, supra note 146 (showing
that all Democrats returning to the Senate in 2011 from 2010 favored some type of filibuster
reform).
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reform plan to ultimately pass, it will likely need to be sensitive to the
previously enumerated concerns that make Senators hesitant to reform:
the fear of having no power when in the minority, the individualistic
desire to have more influence with respect to other government officials,
the desire of non-leader Senators to gain more influence with respect to
Senate leaders, and the concerns about the aesthetics of perceived power
grabs and hypocrisy. 3 13 While implementing filibuster reform in phases
over a period of several sessions of Congress may be a viable option to
help address some of these reservations, 3 14 the instant proposal focuses
on substantive changes to the filibuster that would be sensitive to
Senators' reservations about reforming it. The Senate should pass a
modified version of the Bennet Proposal that stays true to the original
resolution's goals but includes modifications to address its defects. 1 5
Specifically, three substantive changes should be made to the filibuster:
(1) on the first two cloture votes, a forty-one cloture vote requirement to
prevent cloture from being invoked; (2) on all subsequent cloture votes,
a flexible cloture vote requirement that can be increased or decreased
depending on the amount of converts; and (3) modified post-cloture
debate times that reflect the amount of controversy created by the
issue.31 6
The first modification, changing the cloture vote requirements on
the first two cloture votes from sixty votes in the affirmative to invoke it
to forty-one votes in the negative to prevent it from being invoked, is
also a key element of the Bennet Proposal.31 7 The time limits of the
Harkin Proposal should be blended with the substantive cloture vote
requirements of the Bennet Proposal on the first two cloture votes. If
forty-one Senators or more vote against cloture on the initial cloture
vote, the motion fails, and up to thirty hours of debate time is allotted on
318
the issue before it can be brought up for a vote again. 8 If the second
cloture vote fails, thirty hours of debate time will once again be allotted
before a third cloture vote can be held.319 Such a proposal would shift
313. See supra Part W.E.
314. See supratext accompanying note 298-99.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 213-17 (enumerating the Bennet Proposal's defects of
an overly rigid scheme for cloture vote requirements that would place vastly disproportionate
influence on particular converts and counterintuitive threshold requirements that made it
considerably more difficult for the majority party to take advantage of the flexible cloture vote
requirements than the minority party); see also supra text accompanying note 230 (discussing how
the specific mechanics for reducing debate time enumerated in the Bennet Proposal could have

unforeseen negative consequences).
316.
317.
318.
319.

See infra text accompanying notes 317-39.
See supratext accompanying note 201.
See S. Res. 8, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); S. Res. 440, 111 th Cong. § 2(c) (2010).
See S. Res. 8, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011); S. Res. 440, 111 th Cong. § 2(c) (2010).
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some of the onus of the filibuster currently shouldered by the majority
and instead place it back on the minority, 320 and would be more in
keeping with the pre-1970s reform tradition of the filibuster being used
on issues on which the minority truly strongly opposes. 32' At the same
time, the maintenance of two-tracking would allow the Senate to move
on to other business as the filibuster occurred.322
Second, creating a flexible cloture vote requirement dependent
upon the number of converts would modify the Bennet Proposal to fix
its defects.323 For the third cloture vote and all subsequent cloture votes,
forty-one votes in the negative are initially needed to prevent cloture
from being invoked.124 However, the number of votes needed to prevent
cloture from being invoked increases by one for every member of the
minority party that votes for cloture, but decreases by one for every two
members of the majority party who vote against cloture (rounded
down),325 so long as the needed number of votes to prevent cloture from
being invoked is not reduced to less than forty-one.326 Under this
proposal, each individual convert would, at most, change the ultimate
requirement for invoking cloture by one vote, instead of by four, as the
Bennet Proposal did.327 This will avoid the Bennet Proposal's problem
of granting vastly disproportionate influence to each individual
convert. 32 8 Furthermore, this proposal recognizes that the field of
potential converts is larger for the minority party than the majority party,
and as such assigns more weight to minority party converts (each
individual convert increases the cloture vote requirement by one) than
majority party converts (two individuals are needed to decrease the
requirement by one).329 This is a direct contrast to the Bennet Proposal,
which counter-intuitively assigns more weight to majority party converts
(a single convert could reduce the cloture vote requirement by four) than

320. See supra text accompanying note 208.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
323. See infra text accompanying notes 324-30.
324. Cf S. Res. 440, 11th Cong. § 2(d) (2010). Unlike the Bennet Proposal, this Note's
proposal does not default to an increased threshold.
325. Meaning that two Senators would be needed before the threshold could be reduced by
one, four Senators would be needed before the threshold could be reduced by two, and so forth.
326. Cf S. Res. 440 § 2(d). The Bennet Proposal's altering cloture vote requirements are more
rigid, reducing the threshold by four votes if one majority party Senator votes with the minority
party, and not raising it back up again at all unless three minority party Senators vote for cloture, at
which point it raises by a full four votes.
327. See supra text accompanying note 216-17.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
329. See supra text accompanying note 325 -26.
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to minority party converts (three converts were needed to remove the
impact of the single majority party convert).33 °
Third, modified post-cloture debate times that reflect the amount of
controversy created by the issue, are specifically geared toward
weakening the Senate hold.33' The reason that lone Senators can enforce
a hold, even without significant support from other Senators, is that if
they follow through on their implied threat to filibuster, they can force
the Senate to spend substantial amounts of time debating the issue.332
Thus, the most effective means of weakening the power of the hold on
noncontroversial items is to limit the ability of Senators to force the
Senate to spend time debating a noncontroversial issue.333 The Senate
should thus amend the post-cloture debate time requirements so that if a
matter is noncontroversial, a final vote on the issue can occur in a more
expedited manner.334 Whenever a cloture vote occurs, if there are less
than twenty-five votes against cloture, the normal allotment of up to
thirty hours of debate is instead reduced to two hours.335 If there are five
or fewer votes against cloture, no additional debate time at all is
mandated and the Senate may proceed to immediately vote on the
item.336 Under this modification, a threat to filibuster, which is what
gives the hold its power, will have little meaning unless the matter is
genuinely controversial, as the Senator placing the hold will not be able
to force the Senate to spend substantial amounts of time debating the
issue without support from other Senators, even if holds are placed on
multiple issues.337 Unlike the Bennet Proposal, which would have
allowed the Senate to pass legislation with no debate at all with a twothirds vote,338 two hours of debate would remain for any issue on which
more than five Senators voted against cloture, and thirty hours of debate
330. See supratext accompanying note 214.
331. See infra text accompanying notes 332-39.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
334. See S. Res. 10, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011) (creating a two-hour time limit for debate on
nominations); S. Res. 440, 11 1th Cong. § 2(b) (2010) (allowing three-fifths of the Senate to vote to
reduce post-cloture debate time).
335. Cf S. Res. 10 § 5. Instead of reducing debate time based upon the substantive type of
matter being debated, this Note's proposal reduces debate time depending upon how many Senators
express opposition to the issue.
336. Cf S. Res. 440 § 2(b). Instead of allowing three-fifths of the Senate to vote to eliminate
debate time, this Note's proposal instead automatically eliminates debate time if there is truly only
token opposition to the issue, and allows two hours of debate time when there is minimal but
notable opposition.
337. Cf Waldman, supra note 5. Under this Note's proposal, the enumerated parliamentary
maneuvers which enable the hold would no longer be available unless a Senator could get support
for a hold from other Senators.
338. See supra text accompanying note 230.
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would remain on any issue for which there were more than twenty-five
votes against cloture.339
VI.

CONCLUSION

The filibuster has become a mainstay of current Senate business,
and with its entrenchment, has also come a record of abuse, including its
ability to enable holds on noncontroversial issues. 340 While few, if any,
in the Senate wish for a complete abolition of the filibuster, the hearings
held on the procedure and the reforms voted on over the past few years
indicate an interest in modifying it. 34' The Senate should take advantage
of that interest and pass the modifications enumerated by this Note that
will leave the filibuster intact but nevertheless rein in its most egregious
abuses.342
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339. See supra text accompanying notes 335-36.
340. See supra Parts II.B., I1.
341. See supra Part IV.
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